| April 16, 2010 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations |
| 1.
|  |
OPEINGLEVINCarl41610, April 16, 2010, Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich) Before the U. S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: The Role of Bank Regulators. 8 pages. |
| 2.
| |
STMTBOWMANJohnOTS, April 16, 2010,Statement of John E. Bowman Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision regarding Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: The Role of Bank Regulators before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate. 8 pages. |
| 3.
| |
STMTFDICBairCorstonDoerr, April 16, 2010, Statement of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Examining the Role of Regulators in the Supervision of Washington Mutual Bank 2004-2008 before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate. 25 pages. |
| 4.
| |
041610Exhibits, April 16, 2010, The exhibits from the April 16, 2010 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 509 pages. |
| 5.
| |
Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of Washington Mutual Bank April 2010, This is a related document issued by the Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector General in conjunction with the hearings, but not included as a part of the hearings. 98 pages. |
| April 13, 2010 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations |
| 1.
| |
OPENINGLEVIN41310, April 13, 2010, Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich) Before the U.S.Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Wall Street and The Financial Crisis:The Role of High Risk Home Loans. 11 pages. |
| 2.
| |
OPENINGCollinsApril132010, April 13, 2010, Statement of Senator Susan M. Collins “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans” Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2 pages. |
| 3.
| |
Statement of Kerry K. Killinger, April 13, 2010, Written Statement of Kerry K. Killinger submitted to the United States Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 28 pages. |
| 4.
| |
Statement of Stephen J. Rotella, April 13, 2010, Statement of Stephen J.Rotella before the United States Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 10 pages. |
| 5.
| |
STMTBECKDavid, April 13, 2010, Opening Statement of David Beck Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Former division head of capital markets, Washington Mutual Bank. 6 pages. |
| 6.
| |
STMTCARTERLawrenceOTS, April 13, 2010, Statement of Lawrence D. Carter National Examiner, Office of Thrift Supervision regarding Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: The Role of Bank Regulators before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate. 5 pages. |
| 7.
| |
STMTCATHCARTRonald, April 13, 2010, Former chief risk officer (2006-2008), Washington Mutual Bank. Statement of Ronald J. Cathcart,
Former Chief Enterprise Risk Officer of Washington Mutual Bank Regarding a Hearing Before the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 8 pages. |
| 8.
| |
STMTCORSTONJohnFDIC, April 13, 2010, Statement of Mr. John Corston FDIC Acting Deputy Director Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection, Complex Financial Institution Branch U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 2 pages. |
| 9.
| |
STMTDochowDarrelOTS, April 13, 2010, Oral Statement of Darrel Dochow before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 2 pages. |
| 10.
| |
STMTDOERRGeorgeFDIC, April 13, 2010, Statement of Mr. George Doerr FDIC Deputy Regional Director for San Francisco Region Before U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 1 pages. |
| 11.
| |
STMTMELBYRandy0, April 13, 2010, Former general auditor, Washington Mutual Bank. Written Statement to the US Senate Permanent Subcommitteee on Investigations. 12 pages. |
| 12.
| |
STMTREICHJohn, April 13, 2010, Statement of John M. Reich Former Director, Office of Thrift Suprvision Former Vice Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regarding Washington Mutual Bank Before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations United States Senate. 13 pages. |
| 13.
| |
STMTRYMERFDICIG, April 13, 2010, Statement of Jon T. Rymer, Inspector General Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on The Role of Regulators in Exercising Their Supervision of Washington Mutual Bank from 2004-2008 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate. 16 pages. |
| 14.
| |
STMTSCHNEIDERDavid, April 13, 2010, Former president of home loans, Washington Mutual Bank. Prepared Statement of David Schneider before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate. 5 pages. |
| 15.
| |
STMTTHORSONEricTreasuryIG, April 13, 2010, Statement of the Honorable Eric M. Thorson Inspector General Department of the Treasury Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 18 pages. |
| 16.
| |
STMTVANASEKJames0, April 13, 2010, Former chief risk officer (2004-2005), Washington Mutual Bank. Statement of James G. Vanasek Former Chief Credit Officer/Chief Risk Officer 1999-2005 Washington Mutual Bank Before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 4 pages. |
| 17.
| |
041310Exhibits, April 13, 2010, The exhibits from the April 13, 2010 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 666 pages. |
| Seizure and Auction Documents |
| 1.
| |
WaMuBidInstructions, September 23, 2008, WaMu Bid Instructions, 4 pages. |
| 2.
| |
Case_Memo, September 24, 2008, Case Memorandum from the FDIC's recommendation to transfer WaMu to JPMorgan Chase. Many pages redacted and almost no numbers, 17 pages. |
| 3.
| |
Citigroup_09242008, September 24, 2008, Cover letter from Citigroup to the FDIC that was attached to a nonconforming bid for WaMu, the amount of the bid is not available, large parts of this letter are blacked out, 6 pages. |
| 4.
| |
JPMCoverLetter, September 24, 2008, The cover letter to JPMorgan's bid for WaMu, all the good stuff is blacked out, 6 pages. |
| 5.
| |
JPMorgan_Bid, September 24, 2008, JPMorgan's filled out bid form for WaMu, this apparently was the only conforming bid and thus the winning bid, 19 pages. |
| 6.
| |
WaMu_P_and_A, September 25, 2009, Wasington Mutual Purchase and Assumption agreement between the FDIC and JPMorgan Chase, 44 pages. |
| 7.
| |
WaMu_Closing_Book, September 25, 2009, details from the FDIC on bidding for WaMu and different bid types and what is included, 112 pages. |
| 8.
| |
WaMu_appt_of_receiver, September 25, 2008, "The Papers", Appointment of a Receiver, issued by Darrel Dochow of the OTS and handed to WaMu at 6:15pm PDT in Seattle, WA, upon the seizure of the WaMu bank, 8 pages. |
| 9.
| |
Approval_for_JPM_to_WaMu, September 25, 2008, OCC letter permiting JPMorgan Chase to aquire and merge with WaMu, 4 pages. |
| 10.
| |
OTS_Grounds_for_Receivership, September 25, 2008, OTS document specifying their reasons for seizing the WaMu Bank and turning it over to the FDIC, 3 pages. |
| 11.
| |
OTS_Fact_Sheet_on_WaMu, September 25, 2008, Facts concerning WaMu at the time of the seizure by the OTS, 4 pages. |
| 12.
| |
FDIC_Response, November 04, 2008, FDIC FOIA response to an annonymous that states other than JPMorgan there was only one other interested bidder for WaMu, and their interest was in a non-conforming bid, no mention if the bid was ever placed. A later document shows this was Citigroup and that a bid was placed, 2 pages. |
| 13.
| |
WaMu_A&L_Liquidation, February 18, 2009, FDIC Statement of Assets & Liabilities in Liquidation for WaMu 12/31/2008, 3 pages. |
| 14.
| |
JPMorgan_combined_PDF, The Puget Sound Business Journal ran a three part investigative series on Washington Mutual’s collapse in late 2009, early 2010. These are the public documents they received and reviewed. The documents were exhibits attached to motions filed in the case. The documents include emails between JPMorgan executives as well as internal presentations. 417 pages. |
| SEC Documents |
| 1.
| |
34-58166, July 15, 2008, Emergency Order issued with press release 2008-143 announcing the SEC 30 day ban on naked short selling in nineteen financial stocks, 5 pages. |
| 2.
| |
34-58190, July 18, 2008, An update admendment of emergency order 34-58166 above with the anticipated operational accommodations necessary for implementation of the order addressed, 5 pages. |
| 3.
| |
34-58248, July 29, 2008, extends 34-58166/34-58190 until August 12, 2008. 2 pages. |
| 4.
| |
34-58572, September 17, 2008, SEC 30 day ban on naked short selling in all stocks, 8 pages. |
| 5.
| |
34-58591, September 18, 2008, Emergency Order issued with press release 2008-211 announcing the SEC 30 day ban on short selling in 799 finance stocks, 5 pages. |
| 6.
| |
34-58592, September 18, 2008, Emergency Order issued in conjunction with 34-58591, defining when and who may be excepted from emergency order 34-58591, and also lists the 799 securities covered by name. 24 pages. |
| 7.
| |
34-58723, October 2, 2008, extends 34-58591 to midnight October 17, 2008 or three days after EESA 2008 is signed, whichever occurs first. EESA 2008 is signed October 3, 2008. 2 pages. |
| 8.
| |
34-58724, October 2, 2008, extends 34-58592 to midnight October 17, 2008 or three days after EESA 2008 is signed, whichever occurs first. EESA 2008 is signed October 3, 2008. 3 pages. |
| 9.
| |
34-60388, July 27, 2009, Rule intending to reduce fails to deliver and address abusive “naked” short selling in all equity securities. Specifies the clearing houses must buy the stock on the open market if the customer fails to deliver. This should end the huge volume of phantom shares trading in a stock and the consequence reduction in share prices due to artificial supply. The way WaMu was killed. 100 pages. |
| IRS and Tax Documents |
| 1.
| |
WaMu_56F, September 26, 2008, IRS form 56-F filed by the FDIC with the IRS informing them of their fiduciary relationship with WaMu, 2 pages |
| 2.
| |
382(h)_to_Banks, October 1, 2008, IRS notice removing the mark to the market rule for banks, 2 pages. |
| 3.
| |
IRS Notice Allows Use of Built-in Losses - Notice 2008-83, October 1, 2008, JPMC received built-in losses on WaMu on top of receiving a write down for these same loans. This explains the elimination of the mark to market rule effect on taking these loan losses. NOLs are also at issue with this tax change, but WaMu's NOLs benefits are in litagation. 4 pages. |
| 4.
| |
irsNotice2008-83-final, October 1, 2008, Section 382 in the Face of the Financial Crises, explains tax advantages received by JPMC from purchasing WaMu and the elimination of the mark to market rule. Though this was passed October 1, 2008, it was made retroactive so JPMC could get the benefits as well. NOLs are also at issue with this tax change, but WaMu's NOLs benefits are in litagation. 20 pages. |
| 5.
| |
IRS_Claim_173, October 24, 2008, IRS claim filed with the bankruptcy court that WaMu owes them $10 billion, 3 pages. |
| WaMu Financial Documents |
| 1.
| |
WaMu_Risk_Standards, January 26, 2007, Letter from WaMu EVP John Robinson to the OTS, OCC, Federal Reserve and FDIC, concerning Risk-based Capital Standards - Market Risk, sharing their concerns and noting where WaMu may receive double counting of default risk if the regulation is passed, 3 pages. |
| 2.
| |
10Q_WaMu_06302008, June 30, 2008, The last official financial statements released by WaMu before the seizure, 66 pages. |
| 3.
| |
WaMu_2ndQtr_summary, July 22, 2008, WaMu Reports Significant Build-Up of Reserves Contributing to Second Quarter Net Loss of $3.3 Billion, 62 pages. |
| 4.
| |
103-1, numerous dates in 2008, The WaMu Bank owned a subsidary bank called Washington Mutual Bank fsb (fsb = federal savings bank), which kept its own separate set of books. The Washington Mutual Bank fsb had an extremely strong cash position, and lent money to the WaMu Bank. On page 45 of this pdf, document page B95, there is a planned arrangement dated August 14, 2008, to move $20 billion dollars from the subsidary bank Washington Mutual Bank fsb to the main bank, the WaMu Bank, to provide the WaMu Bank with additional liquidity and capital. The point being that the WaMu Bank had access to plenty of capital and liquidity of its own, and that the OTS/FDIC seizure of the banks for lack of liquidity is simply and clearly false. The banks were seized and destroyed needlessly and the investors wiped out needlessly. The FDIC which instigated the seizure, had simply not asked, or had not done its homework, or was outright criminal. Investors and WaMu need to be compensated for this gross gross negligence. 50 pages. |
| 5.
| |
Fishman_letter_091808, September 18, 2008, Letter to WaMu customers from new CEO Alan Fishman describing the strengths of the bank, 1 page. |
| 6.
| |
Landefeld_Doc, October 1, 2008, Stewart Landefeld EVP WMI affirms WMB had credit access at the FRB secondary discount window, thus access to liquidity, 2 pages. |
| 7.
| |
Thomas Blake, undated court doc, exhibit B, pdf pg 9, document page B259, is the table of the withdrawl totals for WaMu from 07/14/2008 - 10/06/2008, the critical time phase, 50 pages. |
| 8.
|  |
WM_Yahoo_Finance_Pages, Friday September 26, 2008. The majority of Yahoo Finance pages for WM, WaMu's symbol when seized, as they stood on Sunday September 28, 2008. 21 mhtml pages. You must click the iexplorer icon at left which will open up a MediaFire page where the documents can be downloaded from. They will not download with a right click...from this page. These pages are provided for educational purposes. |
| JPMC Documents |
| 1.
| |
JPM_News_2008_9_25, September 25, 2008, JPMC news release of acquiring WaMu, 3 pages. |
| 2.
| |
JPM_WM analyst press release, September 25, 2008, JPMC press release and brief analysis of the acquisition of WaMu. Issued on the eve of the seizure, 5 pages. |
| 3.
| |
JPM_WM analyst presentation, September 25, 2008, JPMC full analyst presentation to JPMC investors on the eve of the WaMu seizure and transfer, 23 pages. |
| 4.
| |
2008_JPMC_Letter_to_shareholders, March 23, 2009, CEO Jaime Dimon annual letter to JPMC shareholders for 2008 year results. He discusses the WaMu purchase on page 9. 28 pages. |
| Court Documents |
WMI CH 11, Delaware Bankruptcy Court, Case 08-12229, Judge Mary F. Walrath
|
| 1.
| |
WaMu_BR_Filing, September 26, 2008, WaMu Inc's bankruptcy filing one day after the seizure of the WaMu Bank, 12 pages. |
| 2.
| |
WaMu Notice to Debtors Estates, November 19, 2008, Court finding that WaMu's NOLs are property of the Debtors Estates, 6 pages. |
3.
| |
JPM_v_WaMu_FDIC_lawsuit, March 24 2009, Adversary Proceeding No. is left blank, JP Morgan sues WaMu and the FDIC over the WaMu seizure and auction, 250 pages. |
| 4.
| |
Affidavit of Doreen Logan, Adversary Proceeding No. 09-50934, undated, but Spring 2009, The details of WMI cash deposits of $3.668 billion in one account at WMBfsb, and $135 million in five smaller accounts with WMB. 216 pages. |
| 5.
| |
Debtors Answer: Proceeding No. 09-50551, September 11, 2009, WaMu's response and counter claims to JPMC claims in WaMu's bankruptcy proceeding. 327 pages. |
| 6.
| |
Texas Debtors - First Suit, 2008, The Texas Suit. Starting on page 19 of this bankruptcy filing, is a copy of the Texas Debtors First Suit. Creditors request an examination of JPMC alleging many things including JPMC planted moles in WaMu and commited corporate fraud. The judge said the suit needed to be tightened up before it could be accepted. 102 pages. The case has been moved from Texas to Washington DC. |
WMI Sues the FDIC, US District Court, District of Columbia, Case 1:09-cv-00533, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer
|
| 7.
| |
WMI_v_FDIC_lawsuit, March 20, 2009, WMI files suit against the FDIC for seizure of the WaMu bank, 39 pages. |
| 8.
| |
FDIC_response_061109, June 11, 2009, The FDIC's response to the WaMu Inc. lawsuit. 32 pages. |
| 9.
| |
Motion_to_dismiss_061109, June 11, 2009, The FDIC files a motion to dismiss the law suit brought by WaMu Inc. 3 pages. |
| 10.
| |
Memorandum_on_partial_motion_to_dismiss_061109, June 11, 2009, The FDIC lays out its reasons why the WaMu Inc. lawsuit should be dismissed. 36 pages. |
| Letters |
| 1.
| |
Killinger_short_ban, July 17, 2008, request from WaMu CEO Kerry Killinger to the SEC that WaMu be included on the July 21, 2008 naked shorting ban list with 19 other financial stocks. He points out that WaMu and others have more acutely experienced the effects of
false rumors and abusive naked short selling than many stocks that have been included on the list, and that WaMu and the others will be exposed to even greater abuses as a result of being excluded from the order. He is refused. WaMu is naked shorted into oblivion, 2 pages. |
| 2.
| |
John_Hempton_letter_fdic, undated, but after the seizure of WaMu and shortly after the passing of EESA 2008. Details his analysis of the finance sectors failure, and ends with the clear observation that if WaMu needed more liquidity, a debt for equity swap would have served the purpose far better than a seizure, and that this blundered opportunity will weigh on the US markets until acknowledged and treated. He also mentions that Sheila Bair Chair of the FDIC should resign, essentially for gross lack of financial knowledge. 9 pages, the best page is the last. |
| 3.
| |
Mike Stathis SEC WaMu Complaint, October 7, 2008, Mike Stathis of Apex Venture Advisors complaint to the SEC detailing insider trading and naked short selling attacks, despite SEC rulings, against WaMu. 33 pages. |
| 4.
| |
scbair091504, probably September 15, 2004, A letter Sheila Bair wrote out of the goodness of her heart to the SEC in which she advises the SEC not to take steps to register hedge funds. She argues the SEC is understaffed and over worked and couldn’t adequately do the job. That the step of registering hedge funds would look like an SEC endorsement of them and lessen investor due diligence. She advises that the whole idea could blow up in the SEC’s face and become a scandal. She wants the SEC to rise to glory so she advises the SEC to leave the hedge funds alone. Essentially she is advocating that the rich be left alone to play their money games anonymously and in private. Hedge funds go on to naked short the financial system into disaster and bring down WaMu. 5 pages. |
